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Introduction 
Is personal revelation the right of the subject alone or can others tell 
the story even without consent? The question lies at the heart of recent 
celebrity privacy cases. When Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-
jones claimed their wedding party had been intercepted by underground 
paparazzi with the photographs to be published in Hello!, their com-
plaint was not that they should be let alone completely. Indeed they had 
contracted with OK! to give the public account of their celebration with 
carefully vetted authorised pictures. Yet they claimed their privacy was 
implicated and the equitable action for breach of confidence was the way 
to protect this; a claim partly and with some reservations accepted by 
the courts, which refused an interlocutory injunction 1 but subsequently 
allowed damages for the unauthorised publication (at the time suggest-
ing the injunction should have been awarded).Z When Naomi Campbell 
found herself the subject of an article in the Mirror revealing details of 
her treatment for a drug addiction, with covertly taken photographs in 
support, her essential complaint was that the story had been obtained and 
published without her knowledge or approval (although conceding that 
her own previous false accounts meant she was in no position to prevent 
telling about her addiction). Further, the House of Lords left her the option 
in finding her confidence breached. 3 In the New Zealand case of Hoskingv. 
Runting, where a tort of public disclosure of private facts was recognised 
We are grateful to Andrew Kenyon for helpful comments and advice in the course of 
preparing this chapter. 
1 Douglas v. Hello! Ltd (200 l) QB 967. 
2 Douglasv. Hello! Ltd [2006] QB 125, approving in part the decision of Lindsay I in Douglasv. 
Hello! Ltd 120031 3 All ER 996. 
3 Campbell v. MGN Ltd (2004 J 2 AC 157. 
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(a doctrine rather similar to breach of confidence in other jurisdictions),4 
the Court of Appeal might have given a remedy against publication in 
New Idea of the defendant's surreptitious photographs of the normally 
self-publicising celebrity plaintiffs' family outing had the information 
been treated as private and confidential by the parties involved.5 Von 
Hannover v. Germany involved a claim about Princess Caroli ne's enti tle-
ment to determine when aspects of her personal life should be told to 
the public through the press and when they shou ld not- and although 
the European Court suggested the more serious violation of Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights6 Jay in the paparazzi's intrusive 
practices of constant surveillance, it also accepted th is basic entitlement 
continued notwithstanding her celebrity status.? 
The privacy claims in these cases seem far removed from the right to be 
'let alone' talked of in classic texts.8 Has the language of'privacy' become a 
mask fo r protection of other interests not really to do with privacy at all-a 
de facto publicity right perhaps? Or is it rather that privacy can no longer, 
if ever it could, be simply about the right to be let alo ne? We contend the 
latter and, moreover, that the equitable breach of confidence doctrine is 
well-suited to embrace and sustain the controlled self-revelatory aspect 
of modern celebrity privacy cases. Nor should this surprise: early cases 
in which the doctrine was established were in subject matter, situations, 
themes, and even language more notable for their simil ari ties with than 
differences from the recent cases. 
Prince Albert v. Strange: a case study in celebrity privacy 
The case of Prince Albert v. Strangr? was, as Lord Cottenham LC said, 
distinguished more by the 'exalted station of the Plaintiff' than by any 
difficulty in the principle to be applied. fndeed, there were several. 
4 Especially those jurisdictions which accepted surreptitious obtaining as giving rise to a 
confidential ity obligation (a position New Zealand courts had ruled out): see Megan 
Richardson, 'Privacy and Precedent: The Court of Appeal's Decision in Hoski11gv. Ru11ting' 
(2005) l l New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 82. 
5 Hoskingv. Runting ]2005] I NZLR I. 
6 Opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 June 1952). 
7 Von Hannoverv. Germany (2005) 40 EHRR I. 
8 Most famously Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, ' The Right to Privacy' (1890) 4 Harvard 
Law Review L93, who said ' the principle which protects personal writings and other personal 
products ... against publication in any form, is in rea lity ... a principle of inviolate 
personality': at 196-7. 
~ Priuce Albert v. Strauge ( 1849) I H & TW 1; 47 ER 1302. 
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Breach of trust und cot~fidence 
Breach of ' trust, confidence or contract' was an obvious basis for the 
grant of an injunction to prevent sales of a catalogue containing descrip-
tions of family etchings which Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort 
had executed for private enjoyment 10 - at least once it was dear how the 
information had come into the hands of the defendant, William Strange. 
There was some doubt about this initially; as a result, discussion of trust 
and confidence featured little in the first instance judgment of Knight 
Bruce Y-C. 11 However, it eventually emerged that copies of the etchings, 
entrusted to a printer for the purpose of having limited copies made 
for private circulation, had been passed by an employee of the printer 
lo a journalist, Jasper Judge, who passed them to Strange for the pur-
pose of mounting a public exhibition. The plan was abandoned once it 
was clear that royal permission would not be given, but Strange sought 
to publish the descriptive catalogue he had prepared so as to recover 
the costs incurred. He argued his innocence but as Lord Cottenham 
LC noted, he could 'not suggest ... any mode by wh ich [the etchings! 
could have been properly obtained'. 12 The facts as fou nd were enough to 
find breach of a relationship of trust and confidence entered into with the 
printer, with liability extending to Judge and to Strange through the latter's 
tacit complicity in the wrongdoing. Even so, it was already clear by 1849 
that there were many possible ways in which a person's private activities 
might be exposed to the world, ways which themselves might be secret 
and never fully disclosed. 13 Thus Lord Cottenham LC, taking a strand of 
authority suggested in Abernethy v. Hutchinson (a case similarly unclear 
as to the precise origins of the unauthorised publication), 14 referred to 
the wrongful 'surreptitious' character of the obtaining by Judge; a wrong 
10 The etchings which dated back to 1840 and were signed as being by Queen Victoria or 
Prince Alben, were domestic in character, described in The Times (permitted advance 
viewing, and apparently at that stage ignorant of the royals' lack of knowledge of events) 
as including 'several portraits of the Princess Royal, taken from life by her Majesty ... 
in the arms of her nurse, playing and rolling on the carpel with her doll and other toys, 
amusing herself with the Prince of Wales' and 'portraying other domest ic and interesting 
scenes in the Royal nursery': The Times ( London). 7 September 1848, p. 5. 
11 Pri11ce Albert v. Strange ( 1849) 2 De G & SM 652; 64 ER 293. 
12 Pri11ce Albert v. Strange (1849) I H & TW I at 23; 47 ER 1302 at 1310. 
13 Indeed, the original claim by Prince Albert, later amended, was that the etchings had been 
stolen from the plaintiff's private apartment: Pri11ce Alberc v. Stra11geC 1849) 2 Oe G & SM 
652 at 652-7; 64 ER 293 at 293-5. 
14 Abemethy v. Hutchi11sOn ( 1825) 3 LJ 209; 47 ER 1313, a case concerning the unauthorised 
publi<:ation of Abernethy's lectures, most likely but not ne<:essarily originating in one of 
his pupils. 
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in which Strange was implicated by his knowledge. 15 Such language left 
the way open in later cases for wrongful obtaining in itsel f to become the 
basis of a trust obligation - albeit this took some time, and not all courts 
in all jurisdictions were ready or able to accept the position. (Even in the 
United Kingdom it was only finally confirmed at the highest level with 
the House of Lords decision in Campbell v. MGN Ltd. 16) 
Violation of property right 
The Lord Chancellor did not restrict his grounds to breach of trust and 
confidence, fo r he referred also to the ' right and property' in the etchings, 
which the plaintiff was 'entitled to keep wholly for his private use and 
pleasu re', as justifying an injunction against unauthorised publication. 17 
Knight Bruce V-C had reached a like conclusion. 18 The language of' prop-
erty' is reflective oft he times. By the mid-nineteenth century, property was 
understood to be the starting point of a market economy. Having some-
thing to trade was seen as fundamental to participation in its commercial 
and social institutions and a particularly respected source of wealth was 
labour and ingenuity which, marshalled to the needs of the market, could 
become a pathway to prosperity and progress. 19 Enabling a market lay at 
the heart of many nineteenth-century cases of confidential information. 
Trade secrets were often labelled ' property'.20 So too were unpublished 
texts, including texts of a more personal kind as with the royal family 
etchings- even if here it was acknowledged that value might be found not 
1 ~ Prince Albert v. Strange ( 1849) I H & TW 1 at 23; 4 7 ER 1302 at 13 11 . 
16 Campbellv. MGN Lrd 12004 12 AC457. 1t may be noted that the Law Lords were not always 
entirely dear that the reasoning was not premised on a very extended idea of the relation-
ship of confidence: see, e.g., Lord Hope at para. 85. In this respect Australian courts have 
been clearer, positing that surreptitious obtaining is in itself a violation of an obligation 
of trust and confidence, arising even as between strangers: see Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation v. Lerwh Game Meats (200 l) 208 CLR 199 at paras. 39-40 (Gleeson Cl), para. 
123 (Gummow and Hayne Jj) and para. 223 Callinan J. O n the other hand Australian 
courts may yet find other reasons to consider breach of confidence a limited vehicle for 
celebrity privacy protection; and the possibil ity of a tort of privacy was not foreclosed in 
Lenah Game Meats. 
17 Prince Albert v. Strange ( 1849) l H & TW l at 22; 17 ER l302 at 1310. 
18 Prince Albert v. Strange ( 1849) 2 De G & SM 652 at 697-8; 61 ER 293 at 312- 13. 
19 See Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making of Modem lmellecwal Property Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) chap. 9 (although putting fuller develop-
ment later than the middle of the century). 
10 As, for instance, in the secret recipe case Morison v. Moat ( 1851) 9 Hare 241; 68 ER 492 
(although Turner V -C noted the basis might equally be breach of cont ract or trust o r 
confidence). 
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just in market exchange but in private use, including private circulation 
among family and friends, as was common at the time.21 Recognised as 
'the produce of mental labours, thoughts and sentiments recorded and 
preserved by writing' and 'desired by the author to remain not generally 
known',22 the right of publication of such texts was reserved to the author 
on the basis of a property right in the unpublished work, supplement-
ing the various statutory copyrights in published works. 'Common law 
copyright' has now been abolished by the statutory copyright system,23 
but in 1849 it was well-established. As Lord Cottenham LC said, '(t]he 
property in an author or composer of any work, whether of literature, 
art or science, such work being unpublished and kept for his private use 
or pleasure, cannot be disputed after the many decisions in which that 
proposition has been affirmed or assumed'.24 The issue was simply its 
scope. It was clear that it prevented publication of the etchings after royal 
permission was refused, as Strange conceded. Nevertheless he contested 
the right to prevent publication of the descriptive catalogue, arguing this 
gave information about but did not publish the etchings themselves. The 
argument failed to persuade either the Vice-Chancellor or the Lord Chan-
cellor who observed that 'a copy or impression of the etchings could only 
be a means of communicating the knowledge and information of the orig-
inal'.25 The conclusion: the choice to exploit publicly the property or else 
to keep it for 'private use or pleasure' was the author's choice alone.26 
One common conception about nineteenth-century literary and artis-
tic property is that the romantic idea of the author-genius exerted some 
21 Certainly in the case of Queen Victoria whose attachment to multiplying images was 
legendary: Winslow Ames, Prince Albert and Victorian Taste (London: Chapman & HaU, 
1968) pp. 23--4. 
zz The language is Knight Bruce V -C's in Prince Albert v. Strange 2 De G & SM 652; 64 ER 293 
at 311- 12. Sherman and Bently suggest that references to 'mental labour' in nineteenth-
century cases revealed a lingering pre· industrial natural rights styleofreasoning,eventuaUy 
to be largely superseded by a more overtly utilitarian judicial focus on the value of the 
product: see above n. 19. But in fact Knight Bruce V-C was quite concerned with the value 
of the product: see below n. 31. 
23 Copyright Act 19tl (UK), s. 31. See generally Francis E. Skone )ames, Copingeron the Law 
of Copyright (6th edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1927) pp. 21-2. 
24 Priuce Albert v. Strange ( 1849) I H & TW I at 21; 47 ER 1302 at 1310. 
25 I H & TW I at 22; 47 ER 1302 at 1310. As Skone james notes herein lies one important 
point of d ifference with statutory copyright in unpublished works after the 1911 Act, since 
by that Act tbe right of publication given to the author (Ullder s. 1(2)) was restricted to 
the right to circulate copies of the work to the public: Copinger, above n. 23, pp. 33-4. 
U• I H &TW I at22;47ER 13U2ati310 (LordCottenham LC). 
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influence over the principles applied.27 In reality, in these utilitarian times 
the emphasis was on the value to be found in the work by its audience. 
As early as 1741 Lord Han.lwicke LC in Pope v. Cur/ 28 avoided references 
to the brilliance of Alexander Pope (although Pope himself did not)29 
in concluding his letters could not be made the subject of unautho-
rised publication by the printer Curl, observing that letters written on 
'familiar subjects', 'perhaps never intended to be published', may be of 
'more service to mankind', than any that are 'elaborately written and orig-
inally intended for the press'.30 By the time of Prince Albert v. Strange 
any residue of eighteenth-century romantic reasoning about authorial 
genius that might be discerned in earlier cases was actively disclaimed. 
'The author of a manuscript, whether he is famous or obscure, low or 
high' and whether the work is ' interesting or dull, light or heavy, saleable 
or unsaleable' has 'a r ight to say of them', Kn ight Bruce V-C concluded 
at first instance, adding the law's foundation was ' not ... reterable to any 
consideration peculiarly literary';31 a sentiment apparently endorsed in 
Lord Cottenharn LC's words that 'the property in any work, whether of 
literature, art or science, such work being unpublished and kept for his 
private use or pleasure cannot be disputed' (emphasis added).32 ln part, 
these statements may have been given in response to a suggestion in the 
descriptive catalogue that the etchings' superior quality warranted their 
publication,33 a suggestion evidently contested by Prince Albert. Yet it was 
already clear in mid-Victorian England that there were many reasons why 
a work might be popular- reasons which might have little to do with the 
superior quality of the work and a great deal to do with the celebrity oft he 
author. When it came to materiaJ of a personal kind, Knight Bruce V -C 
intimated, what was really desired was authenticity - an insight into ' the 
bent and turn of the mind, the feelings and taste of the artist, especially if 
27 For the romantic idea of the author-genius, which was actively promoted by some Victorian 
authors, such as Wordsworth, see Peter Jaszi, 'Int roduction' in Martha Woodmansee and 
Peter )aszi, The CoiiStmctiou of Authorship: Textual Appropriatiou iu Law and Literature 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1994 ) p. I at pp. 4-6 especially. 
28 Pope v. Curl ( 1741 ) 2 Atk. 342; 26 ER 608. 
29 The story of the case is to ld in Mark Rose. 'The Author in Court: Pope v. Curl/ ( 1741 )' in 
Woodmansee and )aszi, Coustruction of Authorship, above n. 27, p. 21 1. 
30 Pope v. Ct1rl ( J 74 J) 2 Atk. 342 at 343; 26 ER 608 at 608. 
31 Prince Albert v. Strange ( 1849) 2 De G & SM 652 at 694-5; 64 ER 293 at 311. 
n PririCe Albert v. Strange (1849) 1 H & TW l at 21; 47 ER 1302 at 1310. 
33 See PrinceAibertv. Strange( 1849) 2 DeG &SM 652at 653;64 ER 293 at294 (recording that 
the title page Qfthe catalogue referred to the public's interest in admiring and appreciating 
' the eminent artistic talent and acquirements of both Her Majesty and her illustrious 
Consort ') . 
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not professional' but rather 'a man on account of whose name alone ... 
[the information I would be a matter of general curiosity'.34 
Passing off 
Of course, once it was accepted that insight into a celebrity's 'bent and 
turn of the mind' and 'feelings and taste' was the public's true desire 
it was a small step to acknowledge that authenticity may not require 
authorship, at least in any obvious sense of 'clothing our conceptions 
in words' (as William Blackstone put it in Tonson v. Collins) .35 A third 
claim in Prince Albert v. Strange, introduced before Lord Cottenham LC, 
was not based on violation of a property right in the etchings (or even 
breach of trust), but on a statement in the defendant's catalogue giving the 
false impression that both the catalogue and the exhibition it purportedly 
accompanied were authorised, and therefore authentic. In this early age 
of character merchandising, especially as to royal memorabilia,36 it was 
plainly thought a ready market could be found both for the exhibition and 
for the catalogue, especially if the latter not only gave a list and description 
of the works but aJso had inscribed on its title page that:37 
Every purchaser of this Catalogue will be presented (by permission) with a 
facsimile of the autograph of either Her Majesty or of the Prince Consort, 
engraved from the original, the selection being left to the purchaser. 
Price Sixpence 
If Knight Bruce V -Chad earlier expressed doubts as to the genuineness of 
the defendant's assumption that permission would be obtained before the 
exhibition went ahead (voicing a suspicion that the entire rather bizarre 
H Prince Albert v. Strange ( 1849) 2 De G & SM 652 at 694; 64 ER 293 at 31 1. Certainly this 
appeared to be Tire Times' perception of the public's interest in the exhibition, commenting 
in enthusiastic detail on the subject matter of the etchings rather than any perceived 
expertise exhibited in the artwork (especially in the case of those done by Queen Victoria ): 
see above n. 10. 
35 (1760) l Black W 301 at 323; 96 ER 169 at 181. 
36 See 'Victorian Collectibles' and 'Craze for Royal Relics' published by Collector Cafe at 
http://www.collectorcafe.com/article.asp?artidc = 650 (noting that the craze 'seems to 
have developed in the mid-nineteenth century, reflecting a restoration of the British royal 
family in the public esteem'). For commemorative plates, cups and saucers as a particu-
lar category of collectibles in this newly industria l age, see G. Bernard Hughes, Vicrorian 
Pottery and Porcelain (London: Country Life, 1959) pp. 87, 143 and 149 especially. J.)ed-
ications ' by permission' were also not uncommon in this period: see, e.g., John Gould, 
Birds of Australia (Part XXVI, London: John Gould, 1847) where the inscription reads 
'dedicated by permission to her Majesty'. 
37 See Prince Alben v. Strange ( 1849) 2 De G & SM 652 at 653; 64 ER 293 at 294. 
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project was a ploy erected around a plan to be 'bought off'), the proceed-
ings continued on the basis of the 'overt acts'. 38 T hese, Lord Cottenham LC 
held, were enough to establish a 'falsehood o n the public: for 'as permis-
sion so to accompany each catalogue sold necessarily implies permission 
to sell the catalogue itself, the case is complete of an intention to sell 
under a false representation that the whole transaction is not only with 
the knowledge but with the approbation of the Plaintiff'.39 The reference 
to 'false representation' evokes the emerging action of passing off.40 In the 
twenty-first century we have become accustomed to think the practice of 
character merchandising a recent phenomenon, and with that the exten-
sion of laws about false representations to representations of sponsorship 
or approval.41 Yet, in this early case, we can already see the beginnings of 
an understanding that if the purchasing public places value on a celebrity's 
personal endorsement of goods or services, there may be more than one 
reason to insist that a claimed endorsement be given. 
Admittedly, in Clarkv. Freeman,42 decided the year before, an eminent 
royal physician and expert on consumptive complaints could not prevent 
an apothecary selling a quack medicine promoted as 'Sir J Clarke's con-
sumption pills'- the case later taken as authority for a 'common field of 
activity' rule which dogged the law of passing off through much of the 
twentieth century.43 A merely libellous publication was not thought by 
Lord Langdale MR, who recalled the dark days of the Star Chamber, to 
warrant an injunction. Such conduct was, it was said, 'one o f the taxes' to 
~8 Prince Albert v. Strange (1849) 2 De G & SM 652 at 688; 64 ER 293 at 308. 
J9 Prince Albert v. Strange ( 1849) I H & TW I at 9; 47 ER 1302 at 1309, continuing that 
the case was like one of 'manufacturers [who] are, as a matter of course, restrained from 
selling their goods under similar misrepresentations, lending to impose on the public and 
to prejudice others~ Tlze Times agreed that 'why indeed' should the defendant be exempt 
from the ru le applying to manufacturers: Tlze Times (London), 9 February L849, p. 5. 
10 See William Morison, 'Unfair Competition and Passing Off ( 1956) 2 Sydney Law Review 
50 at 53- 5, pointing out that this was a strange action in fraud which, though based in 
public deception, gave a right to a person complaining of a name falsely used. 
41 See, e.g., Re American Greetings Corp"s Application; sub nom Holly Hobbie Trade Mark 
[1 984] RPC 349, Lord Bridge at 350, Lord Brightman at 356 referring to what is ' now 
widely known as "character merchandising"' as having 'become a widespread practice'; 
and Pacific Dunlop Ltd v. Hogatl ( 1989) 14 IPR 398 at429 (Burchett J) (attributing the rise 
of the practice to television). 
42 ( 1848) 11 Beav. 112; 50 ER 759. 
4 1 See Morison, 'Unfair Competition', above n. 40,60- 1. Australian courts were among the 
first no t to follow the authority of McCulloch v. May (1945) 65 RPC 48, in which the 
'common field of activity' rule was stated, based on a narrow reading of Clark v. Freeman: 
see Radio Corporation v. Henderson [ 1960[ NSWR 279. This opened the way for passing 
off to extend to unauthorised character merchandising at a much earlier stage than in 
the United Kingdom: see generally lrvitle v. Talksport Ltd [2002] 2 All ER 414 at 421-6 
(Laddie J). 
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which persons of high station become su bject 'by the very eminence they 
have acquired in the world'.44 However, in seeking the injunction Clark 
could not show his professional income prejudiced from such statements, 
wlhich by his own account were unlikely to be believed by the medical 
professionals who might ask his advice. In the different circumstances 
of Prince Albert v. Stra11ge, royal patronage of public events, especially 
of the arts, was established,4~ and the m isrepresentation was directed 
to the paying public who might be misled by a fa lsehood that consent 
had been obtai ned. Further, the possibility of the plaintiff wishing to 
give his endorsement in more suitable circumstances was not foreclosed. 
The Solicitor-General posited that at some later date a royally approved 
exhibition of the etchings might be permitted, say for charitable pur-
poses, adding 'if that so happened, could it be doubted that a descriptive 
catalogue ... would be a very important ingredient of the profit to be 
derived for such a purpose, or that the property or value would have been 
materially deteriorated by a premature ci rculation which had tended to 
sa tiate the public interest in the circumstance?'46 For Lord Cotten ham 
LC, considerations of property - at least in the etch ings and perhaps in 
some broader sense of tradable patronage - made it possible to d istin-
guish Clark v. Freeman and to bring the case within the boundaries of 
established authori ty. 
Had there been a need to resolve the issue of passing off in Prince 
Albert v. Strange, a more precise account of the property at stake might 
have been given. It might have been made clearer that this lies, as is now 
largely accepted, in tradable goodwill, defined as 'the attractive force that 
brings in custom'Y Fu rther, that for celebrities, their ability to provide 
patronage - to give authority, and through that authenticity, to claims 
made by traders about their goods or services (includi ng especially those 
that reveal something oft he celebrity's own 'bent and turn of the mind , ... 
feeli ngs and taste') - is a form of goodwill.48 But, perhaps anticipating 
what would come after the award of an injunction narrowly framed to 
44 (1848) I I Beav. 112 at J 19; 50 ER 759 at 762. 
45 !n commenting The Times (London), 30 October 1848 p. 6, notes that 'J-Ier Majesty and 
the Prince are well known as patrons of the arts~ See also Ames, Prince Albert, above n. 21, 
pp. 24-5, alt hough it may be noted that Prince Albert's greatest event of public patronage 
( the Great Exhibition of 1851) was still to come. 
46 2 De G & SM 652 at 67()-7; 64 ER 293 at 304. 
47 See Erven Wami11k BVv.fTownend &Sons (Hull) Ltd[l979] AC 731 at 741 (Lord Diplock). 
48 It was clear at least in Radio Corporation v. Hellderson[l960] NSWR 279 that a celebrity 
might trade in the opportunity to 'bestow their name', at 285 {Evatt CJ and Myers J); cf. 
lrvinev. Talksporc (2002 ]2 All ER414 at424 (Laddie)), not disapproved on appeal: Irvi11ev. 
Talksport Lrtt [200312 All ER 881. Note also the statement of Burchett f in Pacific Dunlop v. 
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prohibit sales only of catalogues inscribed as permitted, the issue was left 
there. No doubt the market for unauthorised character merchandising was 
less developed in Victorian times than now, when authority is no longer 
considered a particularly reliable guarantee of authenticity. If anything the 
opposite, as in Douglas v. Hello! where the unauthorised publication was 
presented as giving ' real' wedding pictures that the celebrity couple would 
not necessarily wish to have shown.49 Even so it would seem the desire 
for royal relics that then existed was such that an audience of sorts could 
probably be found. 5° Thus, as in modern character merchandising cases 
where a misrepresentation of endorsement or approval is still an element 
of passing off, at least in the legal discourse, 51 it was decided a broader 
basis had to be found in Prince Albert 's case for grant of an injunction 
against the authorised exploitation of material of a private and personal 
kind - a basis found in common law copyright and breach of trust and 
confidence. 
Invasion of privacy 
Privacy was not a cause of action in Prince Albert v. Strange; nor was it 
clear what function, if any, privacy should have. Was privacy protection 
incidental to a property right, as the Solicitor-General maintained;52 or 
was privacy, as Strange argued, an interest distinct from property and 
one not yet recognised in equity or law?53 In response to the latter argu-
ment, Knight Bruce V-C o bserved that ' there are several offences against 
Hogan (1989) 14 IPR 398 that what character merchandising sells is the 'association of 
some desirable character with the product'. 
49 The cover of the relevant issue of Hello! indeed bore the words: 'From New York: The Full 
Story- Catherine and Michael 's Wedding': Douglas v. Hello! Ltd [2003] 3 All ER 996 at 
para . 6. 
50 See 'Craze for Royal Relics' above n. 36, noting, e.g., the existence of a market for sales of 
bloomers with the Queen's monogram, which aba ted only when it was realised that these 
were issued to everyone in the royal household 'down to the scullery maid '. 
S l Although Australian courts have certainly been particularly liberal in their readiness to 
find a misrepresentation established; see, e.g., Pacific Dunlop Ltd. v. Hogatl ( 1989) 14 IPR 
398, passing off (as well as misleading or deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth)) found on very little evidence of confusion to subsist in a fa lse suggestion 
of Hogan's agreement to his Crocodile Dundee character being spoofed by a look-alike 
character in the defendant's advertisements for shoes. The remedy there was limited to 
damages or account of profits plus a suitable disclaimer; but in o ther cases, including Radio 
Corporation v. Henderson(I960I NSWR 279, a full injunction has been granted. 
52 Prince Albert v. Strange ( 1849) 2 De G & SM 652 at 671; 64 ER 293 at 301; reiterated in 
Prince Albert v. Strange ( 1849) l H & TW I at 13; 47 ER 1302 a t 1307. 
'
1 Ibid. 2 De G & SM 652 at 680-1; 64 ER 293 at 305; reiterated Prince Albert v. Strange ( 1849) 
I H & TW 1 at 12; 47 ER 1302 at 1306. 
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propriety and morals, which, though causing most serious discomfort, 
pain and affli ction to individuals, the law refuses to treat as actionable, 
unless those offences have occasioned some recognisable damage of a 
particular kind'.54 However, the Vice-Chancellor added, 'the principle 
of protecting property ... shelters the privacy and seclusion of thoughts 
and sentiments committed to writing and desired by the author to remain 
not generally known'.55 In such cases, the Vice-Chancellor acknowledged, 
reaping public reward from mental labour may not really be the claimant's 
object, for 'a man may employ himself in private in a manner very harm-
Less, but which, disclosed to society, may destroy the comfort of his life', 
revealing as it does an aspect ofhimself'of a kind squaring in no sort with 
his outward habits and worldly posi tion'. 56 Nevertheless, the vindication 
of privacy by a property right was rationa lised under the rubric of p rop-
erty- identifying a sphere of 'private use or private amusement' for the 
<various forms and modes of property which peace and cultivation might 
discover and introduce'. 57 The Lord Chancellor went further, suggesting 
that where a composition is of a 'private character'58 and ' kept private', 59 
the author has 'a right to the interposition of this Court to prevent any 
use being made of it' in breach of confidence,60 adding that where 'pri-
vacy is the right invaded' delaying an injunction is equivalent to 'denying 
it altogether'.61 The statement reveals some quite interesting thinking. 
Unlike a property right where the ability to restrain publication was in 
54 Ibid. 2 De G & SM 652 at 689- 90; 64 ER 293 at 309, adding however t hat if a remedy 
can otherwise be granted the breach of propriety and morals may then be brought into 
account. 
55 Ibid. 2 De G & SM 652 at 695; 64 ER 293 at 312. 
S6 Ibid. 2 De G & SM 652 at 694; 61 ER 293 at 3 11 . 
57 Ibid. 2 De G & SM 652 at 695-6; 64 ER 293 at 311-12. 
58 Pri11ce Albertv. Strange (1849) I H & TW J at 23; 47 ER 1302 at 1309. 1s 'private character' 
to be taken as more than simply confidential, or non-public: connoting personal intimacy? 
It is not entirely clear but the Oxford English Dictionary Online suggests such a meaning 
was in use ('privacy' defined to include 'a private matter, a secret; in pl. private or personal 
matters o r relations') . 
59 The words ' kept private' used in the sense that 'any licence or authority for publication 
is negatived' (disclosures to 'private fr iends' not implying 'any such licence or authority') 
as is the possibility of access by others except by surreptitious or improper means: Prince 
Albert v. Strange ( 1849) 1 H & TW 1 at 23; 4 7 ER 1302 at 13 11. 
60 Ibid. l H & TW l at 25; 47 ER 1302 at 1311. although going on to state in language more 
redolent of property that what is meant is that 'I the author! is entitled to be protected 
in the exclusive use and enjoyment of that which is exclusively his own' -suggesting 
Lord Cottenham may not be enti rely sure of his more unqualified pronouncements that 
the entitlement which breach of confidence recognises does (or should) not depend on 
whether the privacy claimant would use or enjoy the information. 
61 Ibid. 1 H & TW 1 at 26; 47 ER 1302 at 13 12. 
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this utilitarian age premised on rewardin g and encou raging activities the 
products of which may be found enjoyable or useful by an audience (if 
only of private friends or even the author alone), when it comes to breach 
of trust and confidence the choice not to publish 'priva te' info rmation 
'kept private' may be a matter of personal choice which others should be 
trusted to respect on this account alone. 
The reasons for giving accord to personal choice over private mat-
ters were not articulated in Prince Albert v. Strange and may not 
even have been fully understood in the very middle of the nineteenth 
centu ry.62 John Stuart Mill's influential argument in On Liberty that indi-
vidual tlourishing in an atmosphere of freedom is good not only fo r the 
individual but for society, was still to come. It was only in 1859 that Mill 
was to elaborate the idea that: 
ITI here is a sphere of action in which society, as distinct from the individual, 
has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a 
person's life and conduct which affects only himself ... [by which II mean 
directly, and in the first instance; . . . land tlhe only freedom which deserves 
the na me, is that of pursuing o ur own good in our own way, so long as we do 
not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtaio it.6-' 
Nevertheless the germ of Mill's thinking was to be found in writings of 
David Hume and Adam Smith who held that a civi l society could only 
benefit from a high level of respect for individual freedom and control.04 
The early English utilitarians who employed the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number as the measuring stick of value also argued that happi-
ness for each person is a matter of individual choice.65 And Mill himsel f 
referred to a 'Greek idea of self-development ... [that i]n proportion to 
"
2 Certainly The Times (the major daily newspaper of the day) in commenting on the case 
initially offered little further explanation of why Prince Albert and his consort should he 
protected from ' int rusive vulgarity; in later commentary on Lord Cottenham's judgment 
referring somewhal more firm ly to a 'public'~ sympathy' with the Royals' feelings that they 
'can no longer endure living in a glass house': see above nn. 39 and 45. 
6 1 
'On Libert)'', in john Stuart Mill , Utilitarianism, 0 11 Liberty, Essay 011 Rwtlwm, cd. and 
intro. M<try Warnock ( London: Collins, 1962) pp. 12(>-250 at pp. 137-8. 
~4 Indeed Hume and Smith doubted 1hat individual welfare could be promoted otherwise 
than by each person assuming, as 'befi ts the narrowness of his comprehension', care of 
'his own happiness, or that of his family, his friends' (Smith 's words in Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, 1759, Vl, ii.3.6); see jerry Muller, Adam Smith iu His Time 011d Ours: Desig11i11g 
rhe Dcwu S<Jciety (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) chap. 3. Mill himself 
doubted whether the care of family and friends should even be assumed; see especially 
'On Liberty', above n. 63, pp. 205- .25. 
(>' Mill criticised Benthan1 for thinking of'a ll the deeper feelings ofhuman nature' as ' idiosyn-
cntsics of taste, wi th which neither the moral ist nor the legislatnr has any concern', 
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the development of his individuality, each person becomes m ore valu-
able to himself, and is therefore capable of becoming more valuable to 
others'.66 With such a rich potential base of utili tarian support for privacy 
as a species of liberty, English courts d id not have to embrace the theories 
of continental European philosophers which treated privacy as an inte-
gral part of human dignity and dignity as an immutable end of human 
existence.67 Acknowledging privacy as a legitimate matter of individual 
choice in P1·ince Albert v. Strange did not preclude acknowledgment of 
other legitimate choices that might be made about material of a private 
personal kind. Even with in privacy a choice of private use and enjoyment 
o r simply no use at all could now be imagined. The possibility of the 
author-subject choosing free public expression, the choice exercised by 
Mill in writing his Autobiography as a means of 'stopping the mouths 
of enemies hereafter', who whispered scand alous things about his rela-
tionship with Harriet Taylor,68 might also be contemplated. So too could 
commercial exploitation of the exchange value of any property that might 
be identified, anticipated in discussions in Prince Albert's case about the 
prospect of an authorised exhibition. Since privacy was an aspect of lib-
erty whose value was defined in utili tarian terms, grounded according 
to Mill 'on the permanent interests of a man as a p rogressive being',69 
recognising the value of privacy did n ot prevent recognition of other 
freedoms as important as well. Further, Mill cou ld easily accept that the 
ability to exercise all these freedoms in a forward looking way and plan 
maintaining that there are higher pleasures that are of more enduring happiness than 
lower pleasures, which those who have experienced both could appreciate: 'Essay on Ben-
tham' in Mill, Utilitarianism, above n. 63, pp. 78-125 at p. 10 I; ' Utilitarianism' in Mill, 
Utilitarianism, ibid. pp. 251- 321 at pp. 259- 62. Nevertheless in accord with his liberal 
views, Mill held that it is for the individual to make the ultimate judgment in matters that 
concern only themselves; and in this respect he was more like Bentham than he cared to 
admit. 
66 
'On Liberty' in Mill, Utilitarianism, above n. 63, p. 191. 
67 Especially Immanuel Kant, 'Groundwork of the Metaphysics ofMorals' in Immanuel Kant, 
The Moral Law: Ktmt's Groundwork of the Metaphy;ic of Moral;, translated and ana lysed 
by H. J. Paton (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1948) pp. 90-J, whose precept 
that persons should be treated as ends in themselves and not means to ends of o thers 
was to become the basis of a 'dignitary' idea of privacy in continental Europe and to a 
lesser extent, under the influence of Warren and Brandeis, the United States: see James 
Q. Whitman, ' The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty' (2004) 113 
Yale Law ]oumalll51. But as Mill pointed out, whether Kant's dignitary ideas were truly 
non-utili tarian, or rather represented his (very extreme) idea of what made for a happier 
society, is another question: ' Utilita rianism' in Mill, Utilitarianism, above n. 63, p. 308. 
68 See Jack Stillinger, 'Introduction' in John Stuart Mill, A11tobiography (London: Oxford 
University Press, 197 1 ), p. vii . 
69 
'On Liberty' in Mill, Utilitarianism, above n. 63, p. 136. 
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'beyond the passing moment', capturing value over time, depended on a 
measure of trust that others would 'join in making safe for us the very 
groundwork of our existence'. 70 Indeed such ideas were- and continue to 
be- intricately connected with the development of the equitable action 
for breach of confidence as a doctrine essentially about freedom (and with 
that security) of choice. 
How little has changed 
Table I 0. I. Instances of'privacy' and 'private' in judgments 71 
Prince Albert v. Strange ( 1849), 
Cotlenham LJ 
Douglas v. Hello! (2000), Sedley L/ 
Hosking v. Runt"ing (2004), Gault P & 
Blanchard J 
Campbell v. MGN (2004), Lord Hope 













Privacy is more greatly emphasised (and property less) in the recent 
celebrity privacy cases compared with Prince Albert v. Strange. As Table 
10.1 shows, there was but one reference to 'privacy' and ten to 'private' 
in the judgment of Lord Cotten ham LC, whereas a comparable appellate 
70 Mill is justly famous for his utilitarian arguments for freedom of speech, conduct and 
property but his argument that 'security, to everyone's feelings the most vital of interests' 
is also of utilitarian import is equally powerful, and allows us to recognise that the ability 
to trust in the conduct even of strangers is the basis of a modern liberal welfare society: 
see 'Utilitarianism' in Mill, Utilitarianism, above n. 63, pp. 309-10. 
71 Recorded simply are instances of 'privacy' and 'private' as reported or used in each of 
the judgments surveyed. To the extent judges simply report what others have said with· 
out lending their support, the tallying process may overstate the value accorded by the 
particular judges, but nevertheless shows something of the value others place on privacy. 
Undoubtedly some of the increased referencing to privacy/private in English judgments 
is due to the United Kingdom's implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights with its Article 8 right of'private life', but New Zealand has no right of privacy in its 
Bill of Rights and even Australia- which has no Bill of Rights- has seen increased use of 
privacy language in modern breach of confidence cases: see, e.g., the judgment of Gleeson 
C) in Australian Broadcasti11g Corporation v. Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199 (IS 
references to 'privacy', 32 to 'private'). 
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judgment in a modern case can easi ly multiply such references many 
times.72 Thus the conclusion might be drawn that privacy is now a more 
significant social value than before - or at least that privacy was an emerg-
ing value in the Victorian age, whereas its importance is now clearly 
established. 
Whether the current emphasis on privacy supports a conclusion that 
a shift has occurred towards a dignitary conception, in which privacy is 
purely and simply a right to be 'let alone', a right of' inviolate personality', 
is another matter. In general little support can be found in the cases. 
Rather, the new talk of privacy appears to reflect a judicial consensus 
that, as Mill claimed, '[aJmong the works of man which human life is 
rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the 1rst in importance 
surely is man himself.73 Indeed in Von Hannoverv. Germany it was simply 
stated that the European Convention's right of private life was 'primarily 
intended to ensure the development ofeach individua l in his relations with 
other human beings'74 -suggesting that dignity is not an immutable end 
of human existence (a lthough it may be a component of tlourishing).75 
Equally, while it is now commonly ac<.:cpted that 'stars are made for 
profit' and 'different star images' are presented to the world, from which 
'the audience selects . . . the meaning and feelings, the variations, inflec-
tions and contradictions, that work for them'/6 the utilitarian logic of 
treating celebrity stories as warranting protection has not escaped the 
7! By contrast there Me no explic it references to ·property· in private inftmnation in the 
above judgments, including the interlocutory iudgrnent of Sedley LJ in Douglas v. 1-/e/lo! 
12001 1 QB 967, which refers to the celebrities' privacy as 'sold ': .11 paras. 140- 1. In its 
subsequent decision the Court of Appeal went further in suggesting that the language of 
property is inappropriate: Lord Phil lips MR for the court .l2006l QB 125 at para. 119ff. 
The conclusion, resting on a rather narrowly Cl}nfineu idea of what const ittlles a ' property' 
right ( tr.eating assignability as the sine qua 11011 and an option not avai lable to 'owners' 
of confidential information), may be too strong: see further Me~an Richardson, 'Owning 
Secrets: "Property·· in Confidential Information?' in Andrew Rohertson (ed. ). The Law of 
Obligatia11s: Couut'rtious and Boundaries (London: UCL Press, 2004} chap. 9. 
7.1 'On Liberty' in Mill, Utilitariauism, above n. 63, p. 1118. 
7~ (2005) 40 EHRR I at para. 50. 
7; Similarly, in the privacy tort case Hoskiugv. Ru111i11g 12005 1 I NZI.R I dignitary references 
are interspersed with refe rences to personal flourishing. leading one of us to conclude that 
a modicum of dignity may be coming to be treated as a component of flourishing and 
therefore uti li ty: see Richardson, ' Privacy and Precedent ' above n. 4, 93. The cl(lSeslthe 
cases reviewed have come to enouncing a dignit;uy c.:onception is L(lrd Sedley's reference 
to privacy as 'a fundamenta l value of personal autonomy· in his interlocutory judgment 
in Vouglas v. Hello! [2001! QB 967 at para. 136 - language avoided by Lindsay} in his 
judgment, who spoke of confidenti<1lity as a m<Hter of'control': Dot•glnsv. Hello! Ltd [2003 1 
3 All ER 996 at para. 216. In their most recent judgment in the case, the Court of Appeal 
appeared to support Lindsay J's position in this respect: 120061 QR 125 at para. 118. 
7~ Richard Dyer, Heavenly Radies: Film Stars and Society (London: MacMillan, 1987) p. 5. 
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courts. Thus in Douglas v. Hello! the celebrities were held entitled to con-
trol the way their wedding was portrayed to their public, their right to 
'profit from information about themselves' acknowledged.77 The infor-
mation shared some characteristics of copyright works, its story-telling 
quality lying in the myth of the perfect wedding between the perfect cou-
ple told to an audience that is at some level aware of the myth.78 But 
the more obvious analogy is to trade secrets is in line with references to 
'profit to be derived' and 'value ... materially deteriorated by a premature 
circulation' in Prince Albert v. Strange?9 
Final ly, courts working in the tradition of Prince Albert v. Strange have 
found it relatively easy to accept that a celebrity may choose to revea l 
selectively certain personal information, including for profit, yet maintain 
the privacy of the rest,80 giving little credence to the idea that privacy 
cannot be 'wrapped up and sold ': the penalty for doing so being privacy 
obliteration.81 Celebrities may find themselves subject to certain trust 
obligations, as Campbell found to her cost in publicly lying about her 
drug addiction,82 but courts have stopped short of treating self-publicity 
as engendering an automatic obligation of utter transparenC)'.83 Even the 
language of 'reasonable expectation' of privacy, which features in some 
77 See the Courl of Appeal [20061 QB 125 at paras. ll3- l9ff. and further above n. 72. 
78 Such stories fit a broad idea of literalure as 'an organ of myth-making, a part of man 's 
dream of self-definition': see Rene Wellek, 'The Attack on Literature' in Rene Wellek (ed.), 
The Artat"kon Litemturea11d Or her Essays(Chape l Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
J 982) p. 3 at p. I 0 (referring to Northrop Frye, Anaromy<'fCriticism (Princeton: Prince! on 
University Press, 1957)). Wellek rightly adds they may not be very good literature, at p. 17. 
79 2 De G & SM 652 at 676-7; 64 ER 293 ~ nd a lso (for an analogy drawn to passing off as 
between 'manufanurer~') above n. 39. 
80 See the Court of Appeal in Douglas V. Hello! l2006J on 125 at para. J 18 where this was 
stated - although the court appeared later to doubt that significant damages could be 
obtained for breach after commercialisat ion, confi rming Lindsay J's modest award for 
' mental distress· to lJouglas and Zeta-Jones and rejecting their argument for a notional 
licence fee after exclusive rights had been sold to OK!: at para. 237ff. and further para. 
I 07 ( if anything suggesting there may be reason to reduce damages for mental distress 
based on the earlier nuthorisation (lf filming and publication by OK!). The reasoning o n 
remedies may be questioned and no doubt will be the subjec t of further comment. 
81 Per Jane M. Gaines, Comes red Culture: Tfte Image, tfte Voice, a11d the Law(Chapel Hill: Uni · 
vcrsity of North CMolina Press, 1991 ) p. 186. Cf. the suggestion by Warren and Rrandeis, 
'T he Righi to Privacy' above n. 8, at 2 14- !6 that public figures abd icate privacy ( in Mill's 
terms an unacceptable slavery cont ract: ' On Liberty' in Mill , Utilitariauism, above n. 63, 
p. 236). 
82 Campbell v. MGN Ltd 12004] 2 AC 457. Query how far such reasoning may be taken. 
~·1 Douglas v. Hello! gives a partial exception in the refusa l of an interlocutory injunction 
aga imt publication of the unauthorised wedding pictures on the ground that the cia imants' 
privaC)' had been 'sold ': see above n. 72 (although limiting the qualification to other wed-
ding pictures). Lindsay I in the final proceedings would have allowed the injunct ion: see 
Douglas v. Hl'ilo! L/t/ ]20031 3 All FR 9% ~t para. 27R; as would the Court o f ApJ>ea l in 
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of the recent cases, has not been taken to allow those curious to know to 
override a privacy subject's choice to maintain privacy if the choice is one 
that might equally have been made in the privacy subject's place.84 The 
conclusion is one that Mill, who hated the 'despotism of custom', would 
have approved.85 
On the other hand, more to the foreground now is the role played by 
the not entirely disinterested agents of public 'exposure' of private, per-
sonal celebrity information: the modern self-styled arbiters of custom. 
Now it is publicly acknowledged by those well-accustomed to its inner 
workings that 'Fleet Street has always had a two-way relationship with the 
celebrities. One day you are cock of the walk and the next day you are a 
feather duster.'86 However, already by the time of Prince Albert v. Strange 
some of the basic features of the modern British media at work could be 
observed: the itinerant disaffected journalist (the forebear of the modern 
paparazzi), the profit-motivated publisher, a burgeoning public avid for 
news - as well as the technologies that permitted not only mass speed 
printing but also mass distribution of its products.87 When newspapers 
were widely available, cheap to read, even cheaper if their contents could 
ibe shared in 'the new urban conditions', and popular in reliance on 'habit-
ual tastes and markets' of an increasingly literate public, it is not surprising 
that they were gathering a substantial following.88 They commented on 
its most recent judgment in the case, especially with the benefit of the decisions that 
came after in the Naomi Campbell and Von Hannover cases: 12006] QB 125 at para. 
253 ff. 
84 See Campbell v. MGN l.td [2004] 2 AC 457 at paras. 94-5 (Lord Ho pe); Douglas v. Hello! 
[20061 QB 125 at para. 107. Gleeson CJ was less dear as to whose judgment should be 
applied in ABCv. Lenah Game Meats (and was the firs t to suggest that a standard of ' highly 
offensive to a reasonable person ' should be adopted, borrowing from US privacy to rt cases, 
and might be part of the test of confidentiality in a breach of confidence/privacy case): 
(2001) 208 CLR 199 at paras. 39-42. 
85 
'On Liberty' in Mill, Utilitarianism, above n. 63, p. 200. 
86 Statement of well-known former Fleet Street tabloid editor Piers Morgan quoted in 
Fraser-Woodward Ltd v. British Broadcasting Corporation [20051 EMLR 22 at para. 16 
(Mann J). 
87 Steam printing of The Times began in 1819, accord ing to Raymond Williams, and this 
combined with access to a railway network gave established newspapers the possibility 
of reaching a wider readership (the same technologies facilitating the introduction and 
spread of alternative publications aimed at new markets): 'The Press and Popular Culture: 
An Historical Perspective' in George Boyce, James Curran and Pauline Wingate (eds.), 
Newspaper History from the Sevemeentlr Ce11tury to the Present Day (London: Constable, 
1978) chap. 2. 
88 See generally Williams, 'The Press and Popular Culture', above n. 87 and further Lvon 
Asquith, ' The Structure, Ownership and Control of t he Press, J 780- 1855' in Boyce, Curran 
and Wingate, Newspaper History, ibid. ch 5. 
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everything including the minutiae of cases before the courts, and on virtu-
aUy every occasion where an opinion might be given it was expressed; nor 
was this inevitably favourable to those considered celebrities, especially if 
the celebrity in question was not an irrevocable part of the establishment-
at risk particularly foreigners and anyone whose opinions or beliefs were 
different from the mainstream. 89 Then, as now, there was also the feverish 
excitement of the story unfolding from day to day, the future never able 
to be foretold by an audience hooked on the drip-feed of serialisation 
through the writings of Charles Dickens and other relaters of fictional yet 
lifelike stories,90 with the opportunity for a judgmental response ever-
present. A. N. Wilson observes that 'one of the strangest legacies left to 
the world by the Victorians is the popular press ... fuelled by sensation-
alism and moralism', its treatment of information turned into a business 
enterprise applying a broad Victorian ethos of 'money-making'.91 The 
sheer entrepreneurship of the enterprise could be admired - and some 
of those involved took great personal risks in their efforts to break new 
ground in the collection and reporting of material.92 For a whi le it might 
have perhaps been imagined that freedom of thought and discussion were 
89 Even figures such as Prince Albert, a German of highbrow taste, were not immune from the 
perils of changing public opinion: see Reginald Pound, Alberr. A Biography of the Pri11ce 
Consort (London: Michael Joseph, 1973) p. 184 and passim. (Certainly support for his 
claim in The Times firmed after his success before Lord Cottenham LC: see above n. 62.) 
Query whether women formed another 'at risk' category: some have observed thai modern 
female stars are particularly vulnerable to critical public opinion: see Richard Dyer, 'Stars 
as Specific Images', in Dyer (ed.), Sum, above n. 76, and this may explain the targeting of 
Catharine Zet<t· }ones and Naomi Campbell for particular media criticism as their cases 
went to court. 
90 Including George Reynolds (editor of the popular Sunday newspaper Reynolds's News), 
'who for a number of years outsold even Dickens with his serialised sensational fiction, 
centred on aristocratic scandals': Williams, 'The Press and Popular Culture', above n. 87, 
p. 49. 
91 A. N. Wilson, The Vicrorians (London: Arrow Books, 2003) pp. 461-3. Wilson is referring 
here particularly to the tabloid press that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth 
century after abolition of stamp duties. But as Williams and others have pointed out, there 
were ways around the stamp duties and a popular Sunday press could be found earlier in 
the century: Williams, 'The Press and Popular Culture', above n. 87, pp. 48-50; Asquith, 
'Structure, Ownership and Control', above n. 88, 106-7 and Virginia Berridge, 'Popular 
Sunday Papers and Mid Victorian Society' in Boyce, Curran and Wingate, Newspaper 
History, above n. 87, chap. 13. 
92 Including Judge and Strange from Prince Albertv. Strange, both of whom became exposed 
to bankruptcy as a result of the case (even though damages were not claimed and costs 
were waived or paid by others, a far cry from the situation with modern celebrity pri· 
vacy cases where costs awards may be even more financially significant than damages): 
see letters to The Times (London), II August 1849 (1. T. Judge) and 17 january 18SJ 
(' Justitia'). 
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necessarily promoted by freedom of tht:! press, as contended by Strange in 
Prince Albert v. Strange.93 But even Victorian liberals ultimately had dif-
fi culty justifying the press>s more muckraking activities in terms of free 
speech. If anything these could be viewed as efforts at controlling meaning 
not facilitating greater public understanding, the utilitarian justification 
for free speech put forward by Mill.94 And in this, Mill concluded, they 
were largely successful - referring to: 
... I the] mass, that is to say, collective mediocrity .. . [which [ do not now 
take their opin ions from dignitaries in Church or State, from ostensible 
leaders, or from books ... Their thinking is don(' for them by m('n mm:h 
like themselves, address ing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of 
the moment, through the newspapers.95 
However, these concerns were not to be expressed for a decade to come; 
and it took until after the end of the following century for courts finally 
to address the problematic question of the public interest in knowing 
information that is neither political nor especially literary or artistic, but 
is simply, as Knight Bruce V -C said in Prince Albert v. Strange, a matter of 
'general curiosity'. 96 
By that time, of cou rse, the equitable obligation was already being 
framed as a filter fo r acts of'falsehood or duplicity las well as I unfair or 
ungenerous use of advantage' in obtaining and/or using private personal 
information, being acts which according to Mill 'require a totally different 
treatment'97 - and modern courts continue to abide by the dictum in their 
assessments of whether a breach of confidence has occurred for which a 
remedy should be given.98 If anything the language of trust has entered the 
vernacular of privacy itself- shown by the European Court's emphasis in 
9
·
1 Prince Albert v. Stra11ge (!849) 2 De G & SM 652 at 667; 64 ER 293 at 300 ( the argument 
did not succeed of course). 
94 
'On Liberty' in Mill. Utilitarianism, above n. 63, pp. 141-83. 
9~ Ibid. 195. 
9<> See Campbell v. MGN Ltd {20041 2 AC 457 at para. 117 (Lord Hope) (freedom of speech 
less convincing where 'there are no political or democratic values at stake ' and ' no pressing 
social need' for publication) and Von Halllwverv. Germauy(2005) 40 EH RR 1 at paras. 60-6 
( if the 'sole purpose [of publication! was to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership 
regarding the details of the applicant's private life, I this I cannot be deemed to contribute 
to any debate of genera l interest to society despite the applicant being known to the public' 
and "in these circumstances freedom of expression calls for a narrow interpretation"). 
'
17 
'On Liberty' in Mi ll , Utilitarianism, above n. 63, p. 209. 
91:! See Lindsay 1 in Douglas v. Hello! (emphasising the surreptitious dnd deceitful character 
of the paparazzi's obtaining of unauthorised wedding photographs, and the defendants ' 
knowledge/notice of this as 'tainting' their conscience and undermining the ir arguments 
that the public interest lay with publication): 120031 3 AllER 996 at para. 198 and paras. 
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the Von Hannover case on the climate of'continual harassment' suftered 
by celebrities at the hands of the tabloid press as supporting a claim under 
Article 8 of the European Convention.99 It remains to be seen whether t rust 
will become less a part of our confidentiality doctrine in the foreseeable 
future, as privacy comes more to the fore. 
204- 5; the Court of Appeal seemed to think that consent to filming by OK' reduced the 
'offensiveness' of He/lo!'s action but accepted that ' the intrusion into the private domain 
is, of itself, objectionable': (2006] QB 125 at para. 107. ln Cllmpbe/lv. MGN Ltd Lord Hope 
observed that '[ 1] he message that ( the Mirror's publication I conveyed was that somebody, 
somewhere, was following [Campbell] , was well aware of what was going on and was 
prepared to disclose the facts to the media' ; a factor pertinent to 'confidentiality' and 'an 
addi tional element in the publication' that was 'more than enough to outweigh the right 
to freedom of expression which the defendants are asserting in this case': [2004]2 AC 457 
at paras. 98 and 124; cf. also para. 155 (Baroness Hale). 
99 (2004) EMLR 2l at paras. 59 and 68 (noting that although the present applica tion con· 
ccrned only publications, 'the context in which these photos were taken without the 
applican t's knowledge or consent and the harassment endured by many public figures in 
their daily lives cannot be fully disregarded'). 
